United States History, 17A







The Federalist #10
           For over three months, during the unusually hot

          summer of 1787, a group of 55 men met nearly every weekday
          in the State House in Philadelphia, and wrote the
          Constitution of the United States.  These sessions were
          closed to the public, and nothing concerning the proceedings
          appeared in the press until the whole work was finished on
          September 17th.  So many compromises were written into the
          Constitution, however, that only 39 of the 55 delegates
          actually signed it.  And many of those who signed, did so
          with reservations, but in the belief that this new document
          was superior to the Articles of Confederation.
           The new Constitution was sent first to the
          Congress of the Confederation, which then forwarded it,
          without comment, to the thirteen states.  Nowhere was it
          submitted to the people for a referendum.  Instead, the
          people chose representatives to state conventions, who, in
          turn, voted their approval or disapproval.
           Nowhere was acceptance of the Constitution more
          crucial to the success of the new government than in New
          York.   New York was not only the most populous of the
          thirteen states, but it lay at their geographical center.
          No union could be solid and exclude it.  Ironically,
          however,  nowhere was criticism of the Constitution more
          vehement than in this state.   Some claimed it had too much
          power; others that it did not have enough.  Many complained
          that it had no Bill of Rights.  And some said that the
          Constitutional Convention had no authority to write it in
          the first place.    It became clear rather quickly that the
          Constitution stood little chance of approval without some
          organized campaign to promote it in New York.
           It was, therefore, the New Yorker, Alexander
          Hamilton, who organized this campaign.  During the winter of
          1787 - 88, Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, another
          resident of New York, wrote 85 letters to various New York
          newspapers.  Each letter was part of a systematic plan
          created by Hamilton, to outline the strengths and principles
          of the Constitution point by point, and thus meet its
          critics head on.  Although most of the letters were written
          individually by one of the three authors, all were signed '
          Publius'.  Shortly after their initial publication, the
          letters were collected and entitled The Federalist Papers.
            Even though Hamilton wrote over 50 of the
          letters, himself, perhaps the most famous is #10, written by
          James Madison.  In it, he addresses one of the chief
          advantages to be obtained by creating a large republic under
          the new Constitution:  the control of factions.
 
 


 

                                             The Federalist #10
 

           Among the numerous advantages promised by a
          well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more applauded
          than its tendency to break and control the violence of
          factions.
           By a 'faction' I mean any number of citizens,
          whether a majority or minority, who are united by some
          common passion or interest in opposition to the rights of
          other citizens.  Controlling these factions is crucial to
          preserving the freedoms of all people.
           The causes of factions can be controlled in two
          ways:  by destroying the liberty which is essential to the
          existence of factions, or by giving the same opinions,
          passions or interests to every citizen. This first remedy,
          however, is worse than the disease.  Liberty is to faction
          what air is to fire.  Without liberty, factions instantly
          expire.  What folly it would be to abolish liberty, which is
          essential to political life, because it nourishes factions.
          By the same argument we might wish the annihilation of air,
          which is essential to life, because it imparts to fire its
          destructive agency.
           The second expedient is as impractical as the
          first would be unwise.  As long as the reason of man
          continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it,
          different opinions will be formed.  A zeal for different
          opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and
          many other points has forever divided people into parties,
          enflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much
          more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to
          cooperate for their common good.  So strong is this
          propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities that,
          where no substantial problem presents itself, the most
          frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to
          kindle unfriendly passions and excite violent conflicts.
           The conclusion to which we are brought is that
          the causes  of factions cannot be controlled, and that
          relief from the dangers of factions must be sought  by
          controlling their effects.
           If a faction consists of less than a majority,
          relief is supplied by the republican principle, which
          enables the majority to defeat the views of the faction by
          regular vote.  The faction may clog the administration, it
          may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute
          and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution.
          However, when a faction is composed of the majority, both
          the public good and the rights of other citizens may be
          sacrificed to its ruling interests.  How can the public good
          and private rights be made secure against the danger of such
          a faction?
            A pure democracy -- by which I mean a society
          consisting of a small number of citizens who assemble and
          administer the government in person -- cannot  hope to cure
          the mischiefs of such a large faction.  It would overwhelm
          the opinions of the minority in any pure democracy. That is
          why such democracies have always been spectacles of
          turbulence and contention; have always been found
          incompatible with personal security or the rights of
          property; and have, in general, been as short in their lives
          as they have been violent in their deaths.
           A republic -- by which I mean a government in
          which some form of representation takes place -- opens a
          different prospect and promises the cure which we are
          seeking.
           In a republic, control of the government is
          delegated to a small number of citizens who are elected by
          the rest  The effect, here, is to refine and enlarge the
          public views by passing them through a chosen body of
          citizens, whose wisdom, patriotism and love of justice may
          best discern the true interests of their country; and these
          citizens will be least likely to sacrifice that true
          interest to temporary or partial considerations.  Under such
          a situation, it may well happen that the voice of these
          representatives of the people, will be more consistent with
          the public good than the voice of the people themselves.
           On the other hand, what if men of deceitful
          tempers  or  sinister designs, by intrigue or corruption, or
          by other means, have themselves elected as representatives
          and then betray the interests of the people?  The question
          resulting is, whether small or large republics are more
          favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public
          good.  This question is clearly decided in favor of large
          republics for the following reasons:
           In the first place, whether small or large, a
          republic must elect a certain number of representatives.
          Assuming that the proportion of unfit characters is about
          the same in large as well as small republics, the larger
          republic presents a better environment for the protection of
          the public good, because the actual number of unfit
          representatives would be proportionally fewer than in small
          republics.
           In the second place, as each representative will
          be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large
          republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates
          to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections
          are too often carried; and the votes of the people will be
          more likely to center on men who possess the most attractive
          merit and the most established characters.
            Hence, it clearly appears that the same
          advantage which a republic has over a democracy in
          controlling the effects of faction is enjoyed by a large
          over a small republic -- and also by the Union over the
          States composing it.  The influence of factious leaders may
          kindle a flame within their particular States, but they will
          be unable to spread a general conflagration through the
          other States.  A religious sect may degenerate into a
          political faction in a part of the Confederacy, but the
          variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of the
          country will secure the national councils against any danger
          from that source.  A rage for paper money, for an abolition
          of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any
          other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to
          pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member
          of it.
           We hold, therefore, a remedy for the cure of
          factions -- the disease most common to republican
          government.  And to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel
          in being republicans, we ought to cherish the spirit and
          support the character of federalists.

            Publius
 

        *From The Federalist, J. W. Ashley, ed.  E. P.
          Dutton & Co., (New York, 1911), pp. 41 - 48.
          following questions:  What is a faction?  How can
          factions be eliminated?  How can factions be controlled?
          Why is a republic the best form of government for

          accomplishing this task?

 
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Revised September 30, 2004
by Tom Gallup, e-mail address: tom_gallup@westvalley.edu
West Valley College
http://www.westvalley.edu/wvc/ss/gallup/gallup.html